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Glossary 
 
ACP  Advanced Cold Process canister 
BWR  boiling water reactor  
CLA  Construction License Application (in accordance with the Nuclear 
Energy Act) 
DiP  Decision-in-Principle (in accordance with the Nuclear Energy Act) 
Fennovoima  Power company established in 2007. It plans to build a new NPP unit 
at Pyhäjoki, Finland. 
Fortum Power 
and Heat 
 Fortum Power and Heat Ltd (formerly IVO), part of Fortum 
Consortium, the State of Finland is the biggest shareholder of Fortum 
with an over 50 per cent holding. Fortum Power and Heat operates the 
NPP at Loviisa and owns 25,8 per cent of TVO 
GTK  Geological Research Centre of Finland 
IVO  Imatran Voima Ltd, 100 per cent state-owned power company 
established in 1932. Known as Fortum Power and Heat since 1998 
KBS-3  Kärn bränsle säkerhet, the concept for final disposal of spent nuclear 
fuel 
LO1-3  Nuclear power plant units in Loviisa, LO1-2 are in operation, 
application for LO3 was rejected by the Finnish government in 2010 
MEE  Ministry of Employment and the Economy (formely Ministry of Trade 
and Industry) 
MTI  Ministry of Trade and Industry 
NPP  nuclear power plant 
OL1-4  Nuclear power plant units at Olkiluoto in Eurajoki, OL1-2 are in 
operation, OL3 is under construction and OL4 in planning 
PASS  Project on Alternative System Studies 
Posiva  Nuclear waste management company owned by Teollisuuden Voima 
(60 per cent) and Fortum Power and Heat (40 per cent), established in 
1995 
R&D  research and development 
SKB  Svensk Kärnbränslehantering AB, Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste 
Management Company 
SKBF  Swedish Nuclear Fuel Supply Company 
SNF  spent nuclear fuel 
STUK  Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority 
tU  tons of uranium 
TVO  Teollisuuden Voima Ltd, operates the NPP at Olkiluoto site in 
Eurajoki 
VTT  Technical Research Centre of Finland 
VVER  Voda Voda Energo Reactor 
YJT  Nuclear Waste Commission of the Finnish Power Companies 
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1. Introduction 
Sweden has been the role model for Finland in many sectors. In general Sweden has been perceived in 
Finland as a modern, prosperous and advanced society. The nuclear energy sector, including nuclear 
waste management, was no exception. The Swedish nuclear industry was aware of its role and thus 
consciously built up the relationship with the Finns on the basis of collaboration (see e.g. Björklund et 
al., 1994, 26–27). In their book focused on the development of the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel 
(SNF) the senior advisors of Posiva1 and Teollisuuden Voima (TVO) point out that in the early stage of 
the power company TVO was inspired by the Swedish power companies’ building and operation of 
nuclear power plants (NPP) (Nikula et al., 2012, 20–22). As the Swedish nuclear energy debate spread 
to Finland the nuclear waste management of the Olkiluoto NPP was influenced by the development in 
Sweden. The actors of the Finnish nuclear energy sector followed the Swedish debate closely and 
observed how a Swedish NPP succeeded in getting an operating licence in line with the Swedish 
Stipulation Act of 1977. The provision of this Act required that prior to fueling an NPP, its owners had 
to show how and where SNF could be finally stored with absolute safety (Sundqvist, 2002, 76–77; also 
Elam & Sundqvist, 2009).    
The objective of the case study is to analyse the transfer and the major modifications of the Swedish 
KBS-3 disposal concept for spent nuclear fuel by TVO and later Posiva in Finland, and further to 
understand how the disposal concept has developed in the long-term and adapted to new societal 
situations. The research questions are as follows: What have been the main modifications of the final 
disposal concept? What kinds of societal arguments by TVO and Posiva can be found behind the 
modifications? In which ways has the relationship between TVO, Posiva and SKB in information 
sharing and technology transfer changed since the 1970s? Our argument is that TVO adopted a 
pragmatic and cost-conscious policy regarding nuclear waste management already in the early days. 
Furthermore, this pragmatic mode of operation was supported by the Finnish nuclear waste 
management system and thus a very positive attitude to international cooperation and follow-up of 
foreign R&D dominated the work.  
The paper covers the time period from 1978 to 2012. In 1978 the first reference concept for nuclear 
waste management was introduced in Finland. The concept, KBS2, was adopted from the Swedish 
R&D work conducted by the Swedish Nuclear Fuel Supply Company (SKBF) which in 1984 was 
                                               
1 Posiva is the nuclear waste management company jointly owned by Teollisuuden Voima and Fortum Power and Heat. The 
mission of Posiva is to plan and implement the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel produced by its owners. 
2 KBS, Kärnbränslesäkerhet in Swedish. 
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transformed into Svensk Kärnbränslehantering AB (SKB), the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste 
Management Company (Elam & Sundqvist, 2011, 250–253). At the time Finnish nuclear waste policy 
and the plan by TVO was based on shipping nuclear waste abroad for reprocessing and disposal. A 
repository in line with the KBS concept (later called as KBS-1) was planned for the disposal of 
reprocessed vitrified high-level nuclear waste if it were shipped back to Finland. An intermediate 
storage facility was also thought to be needed. The time period ends in 2012, when Posiva submitted 
the Construction License Application (CLA) for the final disposal repository to the Government. Now 
Posiva is planning to dispose of SNF into the bedrock in canisters of copper and cast iron at a depth of 
400–450 meters. 
Even if this paper concentrates on the modifications of the KBS concept, part of the story is about the 
changing role of TVO and Posiva in the field of nuclear waste management. Currently Posiva describes 
itself and Finland as a forerunner in certain sectors of nuclear waste management in an attempt to 
render reputable its know-how in the export business. Furthermore the Posiva final disposal facility at 
Olkiluoto site is seen as a world-leading solution by the main shareholder TVO (2012a; 2012b.) Thus, 
due to successful technology transfer the novice aims at becoming the trendsetter. However at the same 
time the new role seems to create some pressure, as there is no one to follow, which Posiva has 
recognized (see e.g. Nikula et al., 2012, 50). 
The structure of the paper is as follows: In Section Two we introduce the framework of the paper, 
which is based on the translation model by Latour (1986). In Section Three the case study, the data 
used and the Finnish nuclear waste policy are introduced. In Sections Four and Five, which comprise 
the main body of the paper, the development of the technology transfer process between TVO, Posiva 
and SKB and the modifications of the final disposal concept are analysed. Conclusions are drawn in 
Section Six. 
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2. Theoretical framework 
In this section we focus on three terms – technology transfer, diffusion and translation – applied in 
analysing technology transfer and knowledge management. The objective is to identify the differences 
in the approaches and then apply the chosen approach, namely the translation model (Latour, 1986), in 
the case study of final disposal concept. 
This paper is a part of the InSOTEC Project, the aim of which is to create a better understanding of the 
complex interplay between the technical and the social in radioactive waste management and, in 
particular, in the design and implementation of geological disposal. InSOTEC aims to study “how 
socio-technical combinations (initial projects) are evolving by integrating concerns and constraints 
leading to compromises and as such to new socio-technical combinations. The robustness of such 
compromises are about the ability to integrate external constraints and adapt to these, including the 
adaptation and change of artifacts, interests as well as identities.” (InSOTEC, 2011.) 
Next we introduce three approaches, namely technology transfer, diffusion and translation to develop a 
framework for analysing the relationship between the concept level modifications and social choices 
(i.e. arguments evinced the reports) (See Table 1). We start with technology transfer. 
 
Table 1. Differences between approaches to understanding technology development. 
Technology transfer Diffusion Translation 
- a producer orientation - a user orientation with a 
focus on utilization and 
implementation, reinventions 
- active networks as 
mechanisms 
- planned and directed - emphasizes the person-to-
person social networks 
- highlights the evolving 
nature of the technology 
- separation of R&D and user 
organizations 
- more spontaneous, mainly 
under the control of the user 
- continuous transformation of 
the token, not transmission 
Sources: Rogers, 2002; Elbanna, 2007; Latour, 1986. 
 
According to Rogers (2002, 326–327; based on Eveland 1987) technology, which may include a 
hardware and/or a software component, is “information that is put into use to accomplish some task” 
and transfer is “essentially the communication of information (technology)”. Thus in Rogers’ view 
technology transfer is the application of information to use. The main type of technology transfer 
introduced is the process of moving ideas from an R&D laboratory to the marketplace. This is noted as 
a producer orientation. 
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Rogers (2002) notes two perspectives on the technology transfer process. The first one is the 
unidimensional perspective, where it is assumed to be possible to identify “sources” and “receivers” of 
technology. In the literature terms such as ‘transfer agent3’, ‘transfer object4’, ‘transfer medium5’ and 
‘transfer recipient6’ are also used  (Bozeman, 2000). The second perspective on the technology transfer 
process is the two-way, interactive communication process. According to this perspective receptors are 
not necessarily passive objects in a technology transfer process, but the process is more like a 
transaction process where questions, answers etc flow in both directions. Thus there are no ‘sources’ 
and ‘receivers’, but ‘transceivers’ or ‘participants’. With the term absorptive capacity – which refers to 
the degree to which an organization is able to devote the resources needed to adopt a new technology 
(Rogers, 2002, 331) – one could then depict the capability of ‘participants’ for technology transfer.  
As strategies of technology transfer Rogers et al. (2001, 254–255) notes as follows: 
(1) Create a boundary-spanning unit in an organizational structure that is responsible for 
technology transfer. 
(2) Transfer personnel in order to transfer their technology. 
(3) Form network relationships linking R&D organizations and receptor organizations. 
(4) Encourage the formation of high-tech spin-offs. 
(5) Organize consensus development conferences to create practice guidelines concerning a 
technology. 
 Barriers inhibiting technology transfer have also been identified. For example, according to Gilsing et 
al. (2011, 641) these are the risk of information leakage, a conflict of interests and scientific knowledge 
being too general. 
To summarize the technology transfer approach briefly, it seems to be based on a producer orientation 
(although a feedback loop is identified), a planned and directed process in which R&D and user 
organizations can be separated. 
Another approach is based on diffusion. Rogers defines the diffusion of innovation as follows: “a 
process through which an innovation is communicated via certain channels over time among the units 
in a social system”. According to Rogers (2002, 329) the key question of technology transfer is “How 
                                               
3 The organization or institution seeking to transfer the technology (Bozeman, 2000, 637). 
4 The content and form of what is transferred, the transfer entity (Bozeman, 2000, 637). 
5 The vehicle, formal or informal by which the technology is transferred (Bozeman, 2000, 637). 
6 The organization or institution receiving the transferred object (Bozeman, 2000, 637). 
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do research results get commercialized?” whereas the key question in the diffusion of innovations is 
“How does an innovation, once available in the system, spread among the systems members and 
become widely adopted?” Diffusion emphasizes the person-to-person social networks, is more 
spontaneous and is thus more user oriented and mainly under the control of a user.  
Bruno Latour (1986) has contested the model of diffusion as it only explains the slowing down or 
acceleration of a process. According to Latour (1986, 266–267) the model of diffusion defines three 
elements in the spread of a token7 through time and space. These are as follows: (1) the initial force that 
triggers the movement and which constitutes its only energy, (2) the inertia that conserves this energy 
and (3) the medium through which the token circulates. According to Latour (1986, 267) in the 
diffusion model everything is explained either by referring to initial power or by the  resistance of the 
medium. Thus in the case of faithful execution, ‘successful’ execution indicates the power of the 
master whereas the case of undesirable and incomplete execution is an indication of resistance. Elbanna 
(2007, 254) has noted that the traditional diffusion model in its simplistic linear form assumes a 
technology push based on previous merits, where the user’s role is seen to either adopt or reject the 
technology. She notes that even when the need-pull is incorporated in the model, the role of the user 
changes only slightly. As a result one can classify technology adopters into different categories 
according to the time of adoption (such as eager minority – awkward laggards). 
The third approach introduced in the paper is based on the notion of translation. Latour (1986) 
introduces the model of translation where “the spread in time and space of anything – claims, orders, 
artefacts, goods – is in hands of people”. These people may act very differently in relation to the token. 
The point of the model is that acting people are needed, because otherwise the token simply stops, as, 
according to Latour (1986, 267) “there is no inertia to account for the spread of a token”. The token 
derives its energy from “the everyone in the chain who does something with it”. As an example Latour 
refers  to  rugby  players  and  a  rugby  ball.  The  ball  will  not  move  on  unless  there  is  fresh  source  of  
energy all the time. Therefore, according to Latour (1986, 267), one can never rest on what one has 
done before. 
The role of people in the chain is important for the model of translation. Latour (1986, 258) states that 
people are actors, as “they are doing something essential for the existence and maintenance of the 
token”, they are not merely resisting or transmitting the token, as is assumed in the diffusion model, but 
“everyone shapes it according to their different projects”.  
                                               
7 According to Elbanna (2007, 254) the token refers to a claim, order, project, idea, gadget, life style, product, or other 
artefact. 
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Elbanna (2007), who extends and complements the research in the area of technology drift (drift 
model) based on actor network theory, has emphasized the evolving nature of technology projects.  
According to Elbanna (2007, 254) the drift model “gives more weight to organizational actors and 
allows them the possibility of moving the project from its initial discourse towards of their own”. 
Elbanna (2007, 255) notes that the translation model “is not about transmission of the same token but 
the continuous transformation of the token”. 
The translation model is applied in this case study. We are interested in the continuous transformation 
of the final disposal concept between 1978 and 2012 (See Appendix 1.) and the societal arguments 
related to major modifications by TVO and Posiva. However, we do not analyse the whole actor 
network behind the TVO and Posiva reports in detail nor the societal debate concerning nuclear waste 
disposal in the Finnish media (Raittila, 2001) or Parliament (Raittila & Suominen, 2002). That would 
be beyond the scope of this case study. Instead, we take the reports as products of the network in which 
TVO as a licensee has the final responsibility for deciding how the results of all investigations are 
introduced to the regulator and political decision-makers. The TVO and Posiva reports have been more 
or less influenced by societal requirements regarding the final disposal of SNF and therefore it can be 
argued that the reports include, although often between the lines, the responses of the licensee, i.e. 
TVO, to society. 
According to Posiva, the final disposal plans are based on the KBS-3 concept, developed by SKB. 
Posiva (2013) states that “[t]he solution is based on the multiple barriers principle. Radioactive 
substances are contained within several redundant protective barriers so that no deficiency in one 
barrier and no predictable geological or other change will endanger the isolation.” Release barriers 
according to Posiva (2013) are the physical state of the fuel, the disposal canister, the bentonite barrier, 
the backfilling of the tunnels and the surrounding rock. These barriers and changes therein, which also 
reflect the modification and translation of the whole final disposal concept, are described by analysing 
certain features of the barriers. The main focus is on canister development, which is followed by 
tracking monitoring the changes in four features: design of the canister, alternative canister designs, 
number of canisters/Capacity (tU) of canister type and (thickness of) canister wall. There would have 
been others, too, such as the welding technology of canisters. Posiva is planning to apply electron beam 
welding for sealing the canister lids whereas friction stir welding is the primary welding method in 
SKB. The bentonite barrier (backfilling of the deposition tunnels and the barrier surrounding the 
canister) and bedrock (tunnel depth/minimum distance between the holes) are each followed by two 
features. All features are listed in Appendix 1. 
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This set reflects the importance of the canister as the main technical barrier and thus emphasizes the 
changed interpretation of geology. Today the primary aim of the bedrock is to safeguard the function of 
the technical barriers and the secondary aim is to prevent any releases. Previously the prevention of any 
releases was the main aim of the host rock (Kojo, 2009a; Nikula et al., 2012, 175). The physical state of 
the fuel is taken into account only on the level of different NPP units included in the disposal plan by 
Posiva. The spent fuel produced by the operating OL1 and 2 boiling water reactor (BWR) units is 
different from the fuel from the Lo1 and 2 VVER units. Moreover, the OL3 unit (European Pressurized 
Reactor) under construction at Olkiluoto will produce a new type of spent fuel. For example, the heat 
production of OL3 spent fuel will be higher, which has to be taken into account in canister design and 
in placing the holes for the canisters in the tunnels.  
On the basis of the main reports selected (see Section Three on data) it is possible to monitor and 
describe the major modifications and also some arguments for these, but it is a challenge to point out 
the relationship between these modifications and social choices and so to understand the socio-
technical combination of the (development of) the final disposal concept.  
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3. The case study data and Finnish nuclear waste policy 
3.1 The data 
The main data of the paper consists of the research reports published by TVO and Posiva due to the 
regulations (See Table 2). The licensees have been required to report regularly on the progress of their 
work. The schedule was set in 1983 in the decision by the Council of State (1983). The aim was to start 
final disposal from 2020 onwards and to select a site by 2000. By 2010 the licensees had to prepare 
themselves to introduce plans for the construction licence. The licensees were also obliged to pursue 
three subsidiary aims. By the end of 1985 technical reports regarding the final disposal had to be 
updated, by the end of 1992 the technical plan for the final disposal taking  into account the alternative 
sites, was to be completed and by 2000 the technical plan for final disposal was to be drawn up.  
The Ministry of Trade and Industry changed the schedule once, as in 2003 the licence holders were 
given two more years to submit the application for the construction licence. The new deadline was the 
end of 2012. This extension was justified by safeguarding the safety of final disposal. (Kojo, 2004, 
232.) Thus, following the schedule set in the above-mentioned decisions, we have used as data the 
summary reports from the years 1978, 1982, 1985, 1992, 1999 and 2012. Furthermore, we have also 
analysed  interim  report  TILA-96  and  the  Posiva  Decision  in  Principle  (DiP)  application  of  2008  to  
obtain more detailed information. The former was reported by Posiva due to the STUK 
recommendation presented on the basis of the review of the reports of 1992 (Posiva-96-17, 2). The 
latter, the application for a DiP was due to the nuclear new build plan.  
 
Table 2. Main data of the case study. 
Year Main Report Due to 
1978 Nuclear Waste Study Planning of nuclear waste management 
1982 TVO-82 Summary Report Requirement set in the NPP operating licence 
1985 TVO-85 Summary Report Following the decision by the Government in 1983 
1992 TVO-92 Summary Report Following the decision by the Government in 1983 
1996 Interim Report (TILA-96) Recommendation by STUK 
1999 DiP application Following the decision by the Government in 1983 
2008 DiP application Nuclear new build plans 
2012 Construction Licence Application Following the decision of the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry in 2003 
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The reports describe the main technical outline of final disposal concept of the time. We claim that by 
comparing the outlines it is possible to trace the major modifications of the disposal concept (KBS 
concept) by TVO and Posiva. These reports are also seen in the case study as being responses by TVO 
and Posiva to regulation and direction from the state on nuclear waste management. We argue that the 
reports help to understand the socio-technical combination of the modification of the KBS concept in 
Finland. We focus on the specific sections of the reports which include descriptions of the disposal 
concept planned by TVO and Posiva. For most reports this meant reading the abstract, introduction and 
those parts of the reports introducing the concept design. In some cases more detailed reports were used 
to clarify the reasoning and details of modifications. We are aware that there is much more detailed 
information available regarding the modifications and scientific argumentation related to the R&D 
activity, but as our objective is to analyse how the KBS disposal concept was modified by TVO and 
Posiva and the nature of the main modifications in 1978–2012, we need to limit ourselves and focus on 
those parts of the reports where the outline of the disposal concept modifications can be traced. A 
tentative breakdown of the major modifications is presented in Appendix 1. 
In addition to the reports the former CEO and the Executive Vice President of Posiva8 were  also  
interviewed. The interviews focused on understanding the development of the context in which the 
disposal concept transfer took place between the Finnish nuclear waste management and the Swedish 
and other international agencies. Two books focused on the history of TVO (Björklund et al., 1994) 
and the development of final disposal in Finland (Nikula et al., 2012) also provided valuable 
background information concerning different stages of the project and the thinking of TVO and Posiva. 
 
3.2 Legislation and responsibilities 
To understand the timing and objectives of TVO and Posiva reporting, the reader should be acquainted 
with the responsibilities of the utilities. In 1978 the Government outlined the organizing of nuclear 
waste management in Finland. The waste producers were responsible for implementation and costs 
under the supervision of the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI). The first operating licences of the 
NPP units in 1976 and 1978 also imposed requirements regarding nuclear waste management. For 
                                               
8 Veijo Ryhänen was the first Managing Director of Posiva in 1995–2005. Before that he worked almost for ten years as the 
Manager of the TVO nuclear waste office (Posiva, 2000). He had worked for TVO since 1977. In 2005 Ryhänen was 
appointed Corporate Adviser at TVO responsible for international relations and special matters related to nuclear waste 
management (TVO, 2005). Ryhänen was interviewed in July 2012. 
Timo Äikäs was the Executive Vice President of Posiva 2009–2013. Before that he had worked for TVO and Posiva since 
1982. In 2013 Äikäs was appointed Corporate Adviser at Posiva. Äikäs was interviewed in June 2013. 
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example, to meet the requirement regarding organizing research activity, the power companies 
established the Nuclear Waste Commission of the Finnish Power Companies (YJT9) in 1978. 
(Björklund et al., 1994, 96–97, 145–147; Suominen, 1999, 26–28; Michelsen & Särkikoski, 2005, 242–
243; Kaijser & Högselius, 2007; Nikula et al., 2012, 24–28, 59–60.) One of the first outputs of this 
collaboration was the Nuclear Waste Study (Ydinjäteselvitys10) of 1978 (Ydinjäteselvitys, 1978), 
which is the starting point of our analysis of the final disposal concept development. 
The responsibilities of the main actors of the Finnish nuclear waste policy were further specified in the 
Nuclear Energy Act of 198711. One of the main principles which was already included in the 
governmental decision of 1978 on organizing nuclear waste management and cost liabilities is that 
waste producers are responsible for the planning, implementing and costs of nuclear waste 
management. A power company which has been granted a licence to operate a nuclear power plant 
(NPP) unit is a licensee under nuclear waste management obligation. Due to this obligation, utilities 
play a major role in Finnish nuclear waste policy management (See Suominen, 1999). 
After the amendment of the Nuclear Energy Act in 1994 banning the export and import of nuclear 
waste, TVO and IVO in 1995 established a joint company, Posiva, to take care of SNF disposal in 
Finland. There has never been a governmental agency12 implementing nuclear waste management in 
Finland as there is in many other countries (See NWTRB 2009). The Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy (MEE)13 is responsible for overall management and supervision in the nuclear energy sector. 
The Ministry also directs the planning and implementation of nuclear waste management. 
Säteilyturvakeskus (STUK), the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority is responsible for the 
supervision of nuclear safety and the use of radiation. 
 
3.3 Outlining the nuclear waste policy of TVO 
Reprocessing and final disposal of high-level waste abroad was proposed as the primary option in the 
Nuclear Waste Study of 1978. The negotiations on reprocessing reflect the fact that at that time the 
                                               
9 Voimayhtiöiden ydinjätetoimikunta in Finnish. It was discontinued in 1995 when Posiva was established. 
10 The objective was to ensure that nuclear waste management can be taken care of safely in Finland from a technical point 
of view and to establish frames for the waste management planning of the power companies (Ydinjäteselvitys, 1978, 3). 
11 Preparation of the new Act was already begun in the 1970s (Ruostetsaari, 1986, 155–159; Nikula et al., 2012, 62–70). 
12 The establishment of a governmental agency was proposed in the 1970s (Ruostetsaari, 1986, 157; Nikula et al., 2012, 62–
64). 
13 Kauppa- ja teollisuusministeriö (Ministry of Trade and Industry) before 1 January 2008. 
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focus of nuclear waste policy was on international nuclear fuel cycles14. An operator, such as TVO, 
was planned to be part of the multinational nuclear fuel cycle to reduce costs and to control nuclear 
materials. The Swedish KBS concept introduced in 1977 was used as a reference concept by IVO and 
TVO (Ydinjäteselvitys, 1978, 2, 112–124). The KBS concept was chosen because of the similarity of 
the geological conditions in Finland and Sweden (Ydinjäteselvitys, 1978, 63). According to TVO it 
was rational to wait for clarification of the situation regarding reprocessing and long-term storage 
internationally before taking any decision in Finland. At that time there were no technical solutions 
available for final disposal. (Björklund et al., 1994, 145–146.) 
The operating licence15 of the TVO1 (Olkiluoto1) unit, issued in 1978 for five years only, obliged TVO 
to negotiate a reprocessing contract for all spent fuel, but later in 1980 the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry announced informed that TVO had not violated the preconditions of the operating licence 
although the company did not sign a reprocessing contract. After this announcement TVO discontinued 
negotiations on reprocessing (Björklund et al., 1994, 145–149; Kaijser & Högselius, 2007; Nikula et 
al., 2012, 29), although only after the decision of 1991 by the Ministry of Trade and Industry and the 
amendment of the Nuclear Energy Act in 1994 final disposal became the primary alternative for TVO 
(Sandberg, 1999). 
In the 1970s and 1980s the two power companies IVO16 and  TVO  had  different  company  specific  
nuclear waste policies and objectives in practice, although the main line of the policy was based on 
reprocessing and shipping the waste away from Finland (Suominen, 1999; Kaijser & Högselius, 2007; 
Kojo, 2009a). IVO transported spent fuel produced in the Loviisa VVER-440 type NPP units to the 
Soviet Union and to Russia in 1981–1996. This arrangement was agreed in the contract signed by the 
Government of Finland and the Government of the Soviet Union in 1969 (Sandberg, 1999).  TVO was 
also guided towards reprocessing by the Finnish nuclear waste policy decisions issued in 1978 and 
1983. However, TVO was also considering direct final disposal17. 
                                               
14 In the 1970s international nuclear fuel cycles were accounted for in the Regional Nuclear Fuel Cycle Centres (RFCC) 
study by IAEA and in the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) initiated by the United States. In the INFCE 
Finland was one of the chairing countries of the studies focused on nuclear waste management. 
15 In 1975–76 TVO wrote a report on alternatives in nuclear waste management. One of the alternatives was long-term 
storage of spent fuel and direct final disposal later. Long-term on-site storage at the Olkiluoto site was also the basis of SNF 
management when TVO applied for the operating licence in 1977. 
16 Nowadays Fortum Power and Heat Oy. 
17 According to Kaijser and Högselius (2007, 23) “TVO:s strategi för hantering av använt kärnbränsle såg i slutet av 1970-
talet med andra ord ut att vara på väg i en ny riktning: bort från såväl upparbetning inom landet som upparbetning 
utomlands. Vad man hade i åtanke var istället något vid denna tid så radikalt som direktdeponering av det använda 
bränslet.” 
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Following the practices of IVO, in the early 1970s TVO investigated the opportunities for transporting 
spent fuel produced in Olkiluoto NPP to the Soviet Union. The request was denied as the Soviet Union 
accepted only spent fuel produced in Soviet-type reactors (Kaijser & Högselius, 2007, 22). For TVO it 
was important to keep the reprocessing option available, as that was a precondition of the operating 
licence for the NPP imposed by the Ministry of Trade and Industry. TVO negotiated on reprocessing 
with United Reprocessing GmbH (URG), and later with Compagnie Générale des Matières Nucléaires 
(COGEMA)  and  British  Nuclear  Fuels  Limited  (BNFL),  but  no  contract  was  ever  signed  as  the  
economic and other conditions, e.g. the return of residual high-level waste, were deemed too strict by 
TVO. (Björklund et al., 1994, 145–149; Nikula et al., 2012, 79.) Later, in the early 1980s, TVO had the 
option to sign a contract for the interim storage of spent fuel in Sweden, but due to schedules and costs 
TVO preferred to build an interim storage of its own18 at Olkiluoto site (Haapala, 1988, 10). 
Reprocessing was an alternative which TVO needed to keep alive mostly for regulatory reasons. 
According to Ryhänen (1979), who reported on the alternatives of spent fuel management and the 
foreign services from the viewpoint of TVO, in the early 1970s it was expected that reprocessing 
services would be available by the end of the decade. However, the situation changed and the large-
scale reprocessing of light water reactor fuel was expected to start only in the second half of the 1980s 
in Western Europe. Thus storage capacity was required for long periods. Research focused on the direct 
final disposal of spent fuel without reprocessing was on-going. International Nuclear Fuel Cycle 
Evaluation (INFCE), in which Finland was involved, was hoped to clarify procedures at the end of the 
fuel cycle.  
In 1979 Ryhänen (1979, 11) reported that according to the Swedish government the KBS solution met 
the requirements of the Swedish Stipulation Act. Furthermore, a detailed plan for the direct final 
disposal of spent fuel had been presented by the Swedes in the later part of the KBS account (Ryhänen 
was referring to Kärnbränselcykelns slutsteg – Slutförvaring av använt kärnbränsle, del I … II Projekt 
Kärnbränslesäkerhet, Stockholm 1977). Ryhänen noted that if the final disposal alternative was 
considered, fuel would first be stored for several decades. Before final disposal the fuel rods would be 
sealed into copper canisters. Thus the Finns were aware of the research and development regarding the 
KBS concept. However, in 1979 it was concluded that both from the point of view of safety and 
economy it would obviously be most profitable if temporary storage and final disposal of the waste 
                                               
18 The plan to build a central storage for spent fuel in Finland was abandoned as IVO had no need for a separate storage in 
the late 1970s. IVO had enough storage capacity for cooling spent fuel for three years. After this fuel was transported to the 
Soviet Union. TVO prepared to build a separate storage of its own at Olkiluoto against the contingency that there would be 
no reprocessing capacity available when the storage pools of the NPP were filled. (Ydinjäteselvitys, 1978, 20–21.) 
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were carried out in a concentrated way, i.e. in the countries which were the major producers of nuclear 
energy. (Ryhänen 1979, 11, 14.) 
By 1981 the outline of spent fuel management alternatives in TVO had changed. Ryhänen et al. (1981, 
Summary) stated that “at the moment it seems apparent that interim storage capacity is needed for 
TVO’s spent fuel management at the end of 1980’s.” TVO was moving further away from reprocessing 
although in the 1980s it was still the primary option of Finnish nuclear waste policy. Ryhänen et al. 
(1981, Summary) concluded that direct disposal was the only alternative available for TVO at that 
time. The most important measure was to arrange for additional storage capacity by the beginning of 
the 1990’s. TVO needed more time “to follow universal development and evaluation of alternatives to 
arrange TVO’s spent fuel management at the right time in a safe and economic way. The question, if 
the fuel will be reprocessed or disposed without reprocessing has to be solved with a long range aim.” 
(Ryhänen et al., 1981, Summary.) According to Ryhänen et al. (1981, Summary, 43) TVO should aim 
to get to use foreign research and development work and experiences, particularly in interim storage, 
encapsulation and disposal technique. 
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4. Development of the technology transfer process between TVO, Posiva and SKB 
In the case of transferring the KBS-3 concept for the geological disposal of spent nuclear fuel from 
SKBF/SKB to TVO, TVO was clearly the initiator. TVO was looking for a solution for managing the 
spent nuclear fuel from its power plants under the pressure of the requirements imposed by the 
Government on the operating licence of the TVO-1 unit in 1978 and on the Government decisions of 
1978 and 1983. According to Nikula et al. (2012, 80–81) it was natural to first look at what others had 
done so far regarding the issue.  The State of Finland moreover supported technology transfer. 
In 1978 the Ministry of Trade and Industry established a working group to prepare a proposal 
concerning the outlines of the Finnish nuclear waste research and time schedule. The focus was on 
studies on the final disposal of spent fuel and its residuals after reprocessing. The report was published 
in 1980. The working group had a very positive attitude to international cooperation and the follow-up 
of foreign research. It was stated that “Therefore in studies and research concerning handling, 
transportation and storage techniques the business idea is to create readiness so that as far as possible 
a suitable technique could be chosen and applied in Finland in light of foreign research” (Nuclear 
Waste Working Group, 1980, 5.) The group argued that the Finnish nuclear waste decisions were 
heavily dependent on the international development and solutions in other nuclear energy countries. 
According to the group, appropriate use of the Finnish resources required utilization of foreign 
research, especially on topics which were not site-specific. The group noted that international exchange 
required that we [the Finnish actors] also have something to offer.  Furthermore, adaptability was 
needed as a small country could not influence the timetables of international projects. Thus the Finns 
should be ready to get involved even if the timetable was not optimal from the Finnish perspective. As 
one example of international cooperation mentioned was made of the Swedish KBS project on which 
“technical reports including detailed results” were received directly from the KBS project. Information 
and experience exchange with the Programrådet för radioaktivt avfall (PRAV) was also brought up. 
(Nuclear Waste Working Group, 1980, 16, 18.) 
The closest relationship regarding technology transfer was developed with Sweden, although there 
were also connections to other countries, such as Switzerland and Canada (Nikula et al., 2012, 81–59). 
According to Ryhänen (2012) the Finns first asked for approval to refer to the results of the KBS 
project in the late 1970s as the power companies were preparing the Nuclear Waste Study of 1978. The 
first  reaction  by  SKBF  was  positive  and  they  were  keen  to  know  if  the  conclusions  drawn  on  the  
Finnish investigations differed from those drawn in the Swedish case. Thus SKBF was interested in 
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having feedback on the disposal concept. The request for feedback could be seen as a first step towards 
a two-way communication process between the parties. In 1980 TVO established an internal 
management group and a small nuclear waste office to coordinate the questions and projects regarding 
finding a solution to the nuclear waste issue. Before that TVO staff in the various departments took 
care of the fuel issues but now for the first time expertise and some resources were organized into one 
office. TVO also started networking with consultants and research institutes19 and signed research 
agreements. Publicly funded research was part of the network. (Ryhänen, 2012; Nikula et al., 2012, 29–
30) According to Nikula et al. (2012, 24–25, 29) the primary objective was to publish reports in 
fulfilment of the requirements of the operating licence and thus to ensure further operation on the TVO 
NPP. The main objective was to establish a basis for long-term nuclear waste management at TVO. 
The Swedish nuclear power and waste policies and the referendum of 1980 were closely followed in 
Finland as they influenced the Finnish debate and decision-making regarding nuclear power issues. In 
the debate TVO was criticized for lack of expertise, plans and funds for nuclear waste management. 
TVO needed to have a long-term plan for final disposal in Finland and connections with more 
experienced foreign organizations. (Ryhänen, 2012; Nikula et al, 2012, 20–22, 29–30, 81). At this stage 
TVO searched for knowledge and information from existing projects abroad. By the end of the 1980s 
TVO, together with IVO, had signed information exchange contracts with SKB, NAGRA, AECL and 
Ontario Hydro. In practice the arrangement included annual meetings for updating the progress of the 
programmes and exchange of research reports. (Ryhänen, 2012; Nikula et al., 2012, 86.)  
The thematic meetings between SKB, Nagra and TVO were a basis for the development of the so-
called Crystalline Group, where organizations studying final disposal into crystalline bedrock 
collaborated unofficially. The most active period of the Group was in the mid-1990s20. Later, at the end 
of the 1990s, due to the deceleration of the Group, SKB and Posiva started negotiations on extensive 
bilateral collaboration in crystalline bedrock research. (Nikula et al., 2012, 93.)  
Access to the KBS project and the other international contacts with the Canadians and the Swiss 
provided the Finns, according to Ryhänen, with a basis for a ‘flying start’. The ‘flying start’ was partly 
based on the earlier connections of the Finnish nuclear industry sector to Sweden due to activities 
related to nuclear power plants (see e.g. Jåfs, 2009, 174–176). In the field of nuclear waste 
                                               
19 In Finland GTK, VTT, the Department of Radiochemistry of the University of Helsinki and Helsinki University of 
Technology were the main partners (Nikula et al., 2012, 30). 
20 According to Nikula et al. (2012, 90–91, 94) relationships between the implementors became closer in the 1990s. 
Strategies and experiences were exchanged at the Directors’ Meetings, to which the most advanced countries were invited. 
Since 1999 EDRAM has continued this meeting tradition.  
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management the Technical Research Centre of Finland (VTT) and later also the Geological Research 
Centre of Finland (GTK) took part in Nordic co-operation in the 1970s.  
Technology transfer between TVO and the foreign agencies was first non-commercial in nature. This 
mode is characterized by information exchange, in practice this refers, for example, to reports, 
workshops and personal contacts. Information exchange was followed by commercial consulting 
already in the early days of the disposal project. Ryhänen (2012) called this stage moving towards more 
project-type work. As TVO tested rock drilling methods in the municipality of Lavia in the mid-1980s, 
some measurement work was commissioned from Sweden. According to Ryhänen (2012; cf. Nikula et 
al., 2012, 84) the Swedes expected to derive some economic benefit as they were ahead in the 
investigations compared to the Finns21. Thus the contracting parties negotiated on keeping the balance. 
(Nikula et  al.,  2012, 94).  International co-operation is  still  an important factor for the work of today. 
The modes of work are quite the same as they have been; agreements on consultation work, knowledge 
exchange and international projects. The Äspö project has been an important project, also participating 
in the work of the International Association for Environmentally Safe Disposal of Radioactive 
Materials  (EDRAM)  has  continued.  Posiva  has  also  been  part  of  the  Club  of  Agencies  group.  The  
collaboration between SKB and Posiva has strengthened in line with new agreements on co-operation 
in 2001, 2006 and 2011. (Nikula et al., 2012, 94.) 
According to Äikäs (2013) the Swedes were sometimes unhappy because they felt that the Finns were 
only picking up their results. Attitudes started to change, however, when the Finns introduced the idea 
of a cold process canister design to replace the use of molten lead (on ACP canister design, see Nikula 
et al., 2012, 109). Later in the 1990s the PASS22 project further strengthened the collaboration. 
According to Äikäs (2013) the PASS project was the first big joint project between the parties, where 
actual technical development work was done together. During the same period the site selection 
process had advanced in Finland, when again in Sweden the process came to a halt, giving TVO the 
opportunity to provide information on the site selection process to SKB. Äikäs describes this change as 
TVO becoming a resource for SKB.  
Äikäs (2013) refers to the collaboration and underlines the importance of the collaboration in the 
beginning of the nuclear waste management process. As one of the most successful collaboration 
projects, he mentions the STRIPA project (1977–1992), which was organized and funded by different 
countries. It was initiated by SKB and the Department of Energy (US), but since 1980 it was 
                                               
21 Posiva sold services to SKB for the first time in 2005 (Nikula et al., 2012, 95). 
22 In Swedish Project Alternativ Studier för Slutförvar. 
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coordinated by the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (Nikula et al., 2012, 85). In 1980 TVO, IVO and the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry joined the project (Ryhänen, 2012). According to Nikula et al. (2012, 
85) the best result of the project was technology transfer to the participants, which was based on well-
established publishing and meeting arrangements without too complex bureaucracy. Furthermore, the 
project was deemed cost-efficient, “which offered for a small country such as Finland a unique option 
to learn about sectors needed in the implementation of a final disposal programme and access to 
research results”. Äikäs describes the project as a learning project and advanced training. 
When the Stripa project was still ongoing SKB started their project in Äspö which the organizations 
which had been participating in STRIPA were asked to join. The Finns decided not to collaborate in the 
construction phase of the Äspö rock laboratory, since at the same time a site selection process was 
being conducted in Finland. According to Äikäs the methods that were used in the construction of the 
test laboratory were also different from those intended to be used in Finland. TVO joined the Äspö 
project later, in 1992, and was a part of the Äspö project until 2012, when Posiva’s own research rock 
characterization facility ONKALO was completed and their own test laboratory was therefore built. 
In the Äspö project which Finland joined in 1992 (Nikula et al., 2012, 82–85, 178) participants paid a 
participation fee to compensate the costs of operations, test etc.23 Later the Finns  paid a separate fee 
for technology transfer to get access to Swedish know-how related to welding technology for the lids of 
capsules. Currently, SKB-Posiva co-operation is based on identifying issues of joint interest, for 
example the development of final disposal technique and encapsulation (Ryhänen, 2012.) According to 
Äikäs (2013), the collaboration and agreements have been cost effective for both parties.  
In general the connections to the Swedes seem to have been quite unproblematic, although TVO was a 
newcomer to nuclear waste management. Ryhänen refers to a mutual understanding, which could be 
interpreted as similarity in organizational culture, which made cooperation easier. Äikäs, like Ryhänen, 
stressed the importance of informal discussions and face-to-face meetings in information exchange. 
Äikäs  also  mentioned  the  building  of  trust  in  face-to-face  relations.  In  addition  to  this  finding,  a  
common language, i.e. Swedish is one of the two national languages of Finland, was important. 
According  to  Äikäs,  reports  written  by  the  Swedes  were  very  welcome  in  Finland,  but  the  language  
barrier made the Swedes selective about the reports written in Finnish. The language issue also came 
up in relation to the informal communication in the sense that it is easier to build a good relationship 
when sharing a language, even if the research language were English. 
                                               
23 According to Äikäs Posiva paid around a hundred thousand euros annually to SKB in the latest stage of the Äspö project. 
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According to Äikäs, the collaboration between SKB and Posiva Sweden and Finland is a product of at 
least  three  important  factors.  Firstly,  there  is  a  common  desire  (all  the  way  from  top  level)  to  
collaborate and acknowledgement of the advantages of collaboration both in costs, problem solving and 
risk management Secondly, the strong tradition in the collaboration affects the work even today, 
making collaboration a natural way of working. Thirdly, Äikäs stressed the importance of a strong and 
shared vision, which leads the way for both companies and helps them in finding solutions. In addition 
to this, the already mentioned co-operation regarding NPP also had a major role in establishing co-
operation in new areas. 
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5. Modifications to the final disposal concept 
5.1 KBS as a reference concept   
The case study starts in 1978, when a report on nuclear waste repository building was released. In the 
report TVO and IVO presented the results of a joint nuclear waste research project launched in 1977. 
The main focus in this report was on the final disposal of reprocessed waste while the disposal of spent 
nuclear fuel was again paid less attention. Consistent with Finnish nuclear waste policy, TVO NPP 
units were planned to be part of international nuclear fuel cycle, as were IVO NPP units. The IVO and 
TVO Study of 1978 (Ydinjäteselvitys, 1978, 1) stated that from a technical point of view there was no 
compelling need for the final disposal of waste. The final decision on the method could be taken when 
the measures were really needed. This would guarantee the benefits of technical development. The 
report also noted that only in recent years had research activities focused more on the nuclear waste 
issue. One factor was public opinion, which had demanded that the waste management issue to be 
solved before waste was produced. 
The study relied mainly on research conducted abroad, and especially on the Swedish KBS project. The 
Swedish model KBS was chosen as a reference model because of the similarity of the geological 
conditions. Other possible solutions for the disposal of waste are also mentioned; such as disposal into 
the ground, the seabed, salt constructions or other geological constructions. These alternative methods 
were predicted to be feasible while transmutation, sending the waste into space or disposing of it into 
the polar ice were deemed mere ideas and very costly. Much was demanded of the geological 
formations where the waste could be disposed of.   The report mentioned that areas with bedrock are 
suitable options for such a disposal method. Disposal into the earth was claimed to be uncertain 
because of the thickness of the earth cover and geological conditions. Disposal into the seabed was 
deemed unsuitable because of geology and international agreements. (Ydinjäteselvitys, 1978, 2, 62–
63.) 
At this time the most preferable option was shipping the waste abroad for reprocessing and disposal. A 
repository would be built for the use of the reprocessed waste if it were to be shipped back to Finland. 
The reprocessed waste was planned to be disposed of into the bedrock at a depth of 500 metres in 
canisters positioned vertically and in canister holes made in the distance of four meters of each other.  
The materials proposed for the canisters were titanium, steel or copper and lead, with copper aluminum 
oxide likewise proposed as a suitable option. Quarz-bentonite was suggested as a filling material of the 
tunnels and holes. (Ydinjäteselvitys, 1978, 2, 63-65, 113, 201.)  
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5.2 Introducing alternative disposal concepts  
In 1982 the reference disposal concept was changed to KBS-2, introduced by SKBF in Sweden in 
1978. Compared to KBS-1 concept KBS-2 was designed for the disposal of spent fuel, not reprocessed 
vitrified high-level waste. Two alternative ways of managing spent fuel were presented in the 
feasibility study by TVO: disposal without reprocessing, or reprocessing fuel and disposal of vitrified 
residual  high-level  waste.  The  starting  point  for  the  report  was  the  disposal  of  spent  fuel  without  
reprocessing. A concept for final disposal into the Finnish bedrock was presented in the report, but the 
solutions and final design were left open by suggesting that the final selection of the method would be 
made relatively far in the future. The bedrock of Olkiluoto was used as a reference site for the final 
disposal. (YJT-82-46, 1.) 
According to TVO (YJT-82-46, 58) the Swedish KBS-2 concept was chosen as a reference concept 
because: 
- the fuel types were similar in Finland and Sweden,  
- the bedrock conditions were similar,  
- the KBS study was very extensive, 
- the Swedish spent fuel was similar,  
- further studies were usable, it was easy to get information and collaboration was good,  
- the similarity in construction technology and the possibility to cooperate in solutions and work 
(STRIPA project).  
 
Even if the Swedish model was chosen as a basic concept, also alternatives were introduced. The 
Canadian and Swiss models were discussed as alternatives to the Swedish one. (YJT-82-46, 62-65.) It 
was emphasized that it was essential to collect information from other countries as well as do Finnish 
research on the subject. In Canada, Sweden, Switzerland, and the USA similar research was conducted. 
It  was stated that  it  was important to actively follow what other countries were doing and also to do 
adaptive work and to facilitate the Finnish disposal. TVO also stated that Finland could, with a slower 
timetable, await results from other countries. (YJT-82-43, 1-3.) 
In  the  Canadian  model  the  canisters  were  planned  to  be  placed  in  holes  drilled  into  the  floors  of  
tunnels. The canisters were planned to be located rather closer together than in the reference concept, 
which, according to the report, might lead to higher temperatures. In the Swiss model the canisters 
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were planned to be placed at the centre of a tunnel and in horizontal position. (YJT-82-43, 20–32; YJT-
82-46, 62-64.) According to TVO, both the Canadian and the Swiss model were more economical than 
the KBS-2 solution. (YJT-82-43, 31-32.) In the Swedish model the fuel rods were to be encapsulated in 
canisters which could be manufactured from copper, titanium or titanium alloys, nickel-base alloys or 
austenic-stainless steels. The canisters were planned to be disposed of in the bedrock 500 metres down 
in drilled tunnels. The wall thickness of a copper canister was planned to be 200 mm. Fuel assemblies 
were to be dismantled before encapsulation. (YJT-82-46, 41–43, 45, 56.) The distance between the 
canisters was planned to be six metres. (YJT-82-43, 21.) Even if the Swedish model was retained as a 
reference model, the report also stated that new solutions might emerge during the years before the 
final technical method was selected. (YJT-82-46, 128-129.) 
By 1985 reprocessing had become a more uncertain option for TVO. Therefore the option for the final 
disposal of SNF had to be taken into account in the plans (see Kaijser & Högselius 2007).  The report 
of 1985 mentions two options; exporting the waste abroad for disposal or disposing of it in Finland. 
The report states that if an international agreement on exporting cannot be reached, then final disposal 
in Finland is the option.  From this,  one could say that  at  this time exporting was still  considered the 
method of choice. (YJT-85-30, 5, 147.)  This was also in line with the nuclear waste policy outlined by 
the Government (Suominen, 1999). For the encapsulation and siting solutions the KBS model was 
chosen as a reference concept. It was, however, mentioned in the report that the timeframe was so long, 
that it allowed developing technical solutions introduced. (YJT-85-30, 8.) 
The report of 1985 (YJT-85-30, 14–15) notes that many materials might be suitable for the canisters. 
Copper, however, was the most studied material.  The research results of titanium, titanium alloys and 
nickel-based alloys were also studied, and ceramic materials were also mentioned as one possible 
material in the future. According to TVO, the high price of nickel might inhibit the use of nickel based 
materials. (YJT-85-30, 14–15.) Due to new results in copper corrosion studies, the copper wall 
thickness was reduced from 200 mm to 100 mm. (Nikula et al. 2012, 104, 106.) Lead was planned as 
filling material for the canisters. (YJT-85-30, 16.) The canisters were planned to be emplaced into holes 
drilled in the floors of tunnels. The holes were planned to be situated six metres apart. Compacted 
bentonite blocks were planned as filling material between the canister and the bedrock and the tunnels 
were  planned  to  be  filled  with  sand  and  bentonite.  Eight  fuel  assemblies  were  planned  to  fit  the  
canister. (YJT-85-30, 16, 25–27.) While in the report of 1982 both the Canadian and Swiss concepts 
were referred to as alternatives to the KBS concept, in 1985 only one alternative was presented and it 
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was said to resemble the Swiss concept. The report did not disclose, why this concept was chosen as an 
alternative except that it was regarded as suitable for the geological conditions.  (YJT-85-30, 30.) 
 
5.3 Changes in canister design  
In the report of 1992 (YJT-92-31E) an alternative encapsulation method was presented that had been 
under development from 1986 to 1990 in order to find an encapsulation process that would be “simpler, 
safer in operation and less costly than the previous system”. (YJT-92-31E, 22.) The new canister model 
also meant moving away from cast lead, which made the construction of the canister more economical. 
Handling molten lead was also seen to entail a risk of fire and the formation of unhealthy gases. The 
design process of the canister evolved towards a design where the inner part of the canister was not 
filled with any material and an inner part of steel was instead developed to maintain the mechanical 
strength of the canister needed due to pressure. (Nikula et al. 2012, 110.) 
 “The ACP [Advanced Cold Process] canister developed by TVO consists of two containers, one 
inside the other. The outer container will be made from oxygen-free copper that provides the 
necessary shield against corrosion. Inside it, there is a steel cylinder whose primary function is to 
ensure the mechanical strength of the canister. (YJT-92-31E, 22). 
The buffer material between the two layers of metal was planned to consist of solid granules. The new 
ACP canister had a copper wall 60 mm thick. The buffer material was planned to consist of lead shot, 
quartz sand or glass beads. The repository was planned to be of a depth of 300 to 800 metres and the 
canisters were to be placed six metres away from each other. (YJT-92-31E, 23–31.) The total disposal 
capacity for spent fuel increased first from 1200 tU to 1270 tU and later to 1840 tU due to 
modernization and the extension of reactor lifetimes. Reactor capacity at Olkiluoto NPP had been 
increased several times due to modernizations. The original capacity was 660 MWe per NPP unit, but 
today in 2013 it is 880 MWe per unit. Due to higher capacity more SNF will be produced.  
In the report of 1992 alternative final disposal systems were studied such as WP cave, Very Deep Holes 
and Very Long Holes and Medium Long Holes concepts. Alternatives were studied together with the 
Swedes in a co-project entitled PASS (Project on Alternative System Studies) (YJT-92-31E, 37.) All 
these concepts according to Nikula et al. (2012) were possible alternatives in theory, but uncertainties 
were found in demonstrating long-term safety, which again would have needed investments in further 
research and thus would have caused more costs for TVO. The Very Deep Holes concept was not 
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deemed a good option because in this concept the only buffer material was the bedrock. (Nikula et al., 
2012, 110.)  
The amended Nuclear Energy Act passed by Parliament in 1994 forbade any import or export of 
nuclear waste after 1996. In this situation TVO and IVO established the joint company Posiva to 
develop spent nuclear fuel disposal. This also meant that the other fuel type from the Loviisa NPP units 
had to be taken into account in R&D activities. Consequently the total amount of fuel increased to 
approximately 2600 tU24. (Posiva, TILA-96-17, 5).  
In the report of 1996 the repository was planned to a depth of about 500 metres in the bedrock. The 
copper canisters were planned to be emplaced in vertical holes in the horizontally built tunnels. To fill 
up the space between the canister and the bedrock, compacted bentonite was to be used. The tunnels 
were to be filled with crushed rock and bentonite. (TILA-96-17, 10.) 
A new canister design was introduced in this report, where the internals of the ACP canister were 
replaced with a cast inner component with holes for the fuel assemblies. A total of 11 bundles fitted 
into one canister. The advantages of the new design were stated to be:  
“simpler encapsulation process, increased compressive strength, reduced risk of internal 
corrosion inside of an intact canister, thanks to the inert gas atmosphere, reduced risk of inward 
collapse due to the corrosion of the inner container in case there is a defect in the copper 
overpack, and it is easier to show subcriticality in all plausible situations.” (TILA-96-17, 10–11.) 
The  spent  fuel  from  the  two  NPPs  had  an  impact  on  the  size  of  the  canister  which  was  chosen  
according to the two different fuel types. The total number of canisters was thought to be about 1500 
(960 for BWR fuel and 560 for VVER fuel.) The copper overpack was reduced from 60 mm to 50 mm. 
(Posiva 1996-13, 43; YJT-92-31E, 23.) Alternative concepts investigated were KBS-3-2C with two 
canisters in a deposition hole, short holes and medium Long Holes. It was concluded in a report that the 
other concepts offered no advantages over the KBS concept:  
“The KBS-3 design is robust and flexible and provides excellent post-closure safety. The transfer, 
emplacement and sealing operations are technically uncomplicated. The alternative options 
assessed do not offer any significant benefits in safety or cost over the basic design, but they are 
technically more complex and also in some respects more vulnerable to malfunction during the 
emplacement of canisters and buffer, as well as common mode failures.” (Posiva 96-12, 
abstract.) 
                                               
24 1870 tU of BWR and 740 tU of PWR fuel. 
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5.4 Decision-in-Principle for the KBS-3 final disposal concept 
On 26 May 1999 Posiva applied for a Decision-in-Principle for a repository for spent nuclear fuel. 
(Posiva DiP, 1999.) The safety assessment report TILA-99 included extensive research material and 
formed the basis for the application. 
According to Posiva the repository was planned to be built at a depth of 400–700 metres in the 
crystalline bedrock (Posiva DiP, 1999, Appendix 5, 2). The canister model to be used was a copper-
iron canister. The space between the canister and the rock was planned to be filled with compacted 
bentonite clay. The filling of the tunnels was intended to be done with crushed rock and bentonite clay 
(Posiva DiP, 1999, Appendix 5, 2–7). The canister was planned to be of copper with a cast iron insert. 
The canister was designed to hold 9–12 fuel assemblies (Posiva DiP, 1999, 6, 44). The void inside the 
canister would have been filled with a gas, for example helium. (TILA-99, 22.) The thickness of the 
copper overpack wall was planned to be 5 cm, although some studies suggested that it could be only 3 
cm. (TILA-99, 24.) Even though the thinner copper wall would have been less expensive for Posiva, it 
was due to results of the manufactory technic tests that 5 cm was predicted as a better option. (Nikula et 
al., 2012, 114.) 
According to the reference case in the TILA-99 report (TILA-99, 24) a total amount of about 1400 
canisters containing 2600 tU of spent fuel was to be disposed of. An extension in service life-times of 
all four reactors to 60 years would, according to the report, increase the total amount of spent fuel to 
approximately 4000 tU and 2180 canisters. If two new reactors were operated for 60 years, the total 
amount of fuel would be 9000 tU and 4500 canisters would be needed. (TILA-99, 24.)  Posiva applied 
for a DiP for a disposal capacity of 2600 to 9000 tU in May 1999, but, due to political pressure, the 
disposal capacity introduced in the DiP application was modified by Posiva to cover 4000 tU, i.e. spent 
fuel produced by the four operational NPP units during a 60-year lifetime. (Kojo, 2009b, 225–226; 
Nikula et al., 2012, 158.) Some of the politicians were reluctant to give a positive signal to nuclear new 
build by granting advance approval for the disposal of the spent fuel of the planned new NPP units. 
The canisters were intended to be emplaced at distances of 6–8 metres from each other (Posiva DiP, 
1999, Appendix 5, 15). The final disposal repository was planned to be sealed off and abandoned. The 
DiP of 1999, however, also mentioned that the disposed canisters could be retrieved (technically 
possible) in all phases of the project. (Posiva DiP, 1999, Appendix 5, 9–10.)  
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Alternative repository concepts were introduced in TILA-99. These were as follows: the KBS-3-2C 
design with two canisters in a vertical deposition hole, Short Horizontal Holes (SHH) in the side walls 
of the tunnels, and the Medium Long Holes (MLH) concept, where about 25 canisters are emplaced in 
a horizontal deposition hole. (TILA-99, 26.) However, the alternative concepts were not deemed to 
offer any improvement on the KBS-3 concept:  
“On the basis of the assessment, it was recommended that further development and studies 
should focus on the basic KBS-3 repository design with a single copper-iron canister in a vertical 
deposition hole. The design is robust and flexible and provides good post-closure safety. The 
transfer, emplacement and sealing operations are technically uncomplicated. Only the basic 
KBS-3 repository design will be analysed in the present study.” (TILA-99, 26.) 
The concept with horizontal emplacement was considered a viable alternative as regards post-closure 
safety, but the advantages (in safety or cost) compared to the reference model were few. The horizontal 
model was also considered to be technically more complex, which might increase technical 
vulnerability. (TILA-99, 26.) In the DiP application alternatives of the basic concept such as deep 
holes, WP Cave and transmutation were also mentioned. Posiva concluded that there were no such 
alternatives for final disposal which, according to current knowledge, could fulfill both the safety 
requirements and objectives of the legislation. Posiva stated that the safety of the concept proposed was 
superior and further that the development stage of the concept was more advanced than the others. 
Furthermore, the concept offered options for development and did not exclude withdrawal from final 
disposal in the future. (Posiva DiP, 1999, Appendix 3, 4–5). 
A change of thought regarding the multibarrier system was apparent during the first decade of 21th 
century. The role of the bedrock was changing from being one important release barrier towards 
securing the technical barriers at first hand and at second hand to function as a release barrier. This 
change of vision also changed the view on the long term predictability of the bedrock regarding the 
endurance of the technical release barriers. (Nikula et. al. 175, 195.) 
 
5.5 More detailed development work  
After the decisions-in-principle of 2001 and 2002 implementation of the final disposal started at 
Olkiluoto (Nikula et al., 2012, 124). One could perhaps therefore say that from the beginning of the 
twenty-first century onwards more detailed development work was needed, such as getting the canister 
design into industrial production and conducting tests on the iron casting and different welding 
  30
techniques on the copper canister. Development work on the bentonite buffers was also done, taking 
into consideration the salty groundwater and the compactness of the bentonite. According to Nikula et 
al. (2012), a very important step in the development of the canister was the co-operation contract 
signed in 2001. Due to this contract Posiva gained access to the same level of knowledge and research 
as SKB, through access to the research results from SKB. (Nikula et al., 2012, 115.)  
In 2008 Posiva submitted the application for a decision-in-principle for an extension to the repository 
for SNF produced by the Olkiluoto 4 NPP unit. The decision on the Olkiluoto 4 unit increased the 
disposal capacity of the repository to 9000 tU and later the application for the Loviisa 3 unit increased 
the amount of fuel to 1200025 tU. The reference concept in the DiP application (Posiva 2008) was 
KBS-3V, with vertical siting and a canister with two canisters inside each other (copper and nodular 
graphite cast iron) and compacted bentonite clay blocks was planned to be used as filling between the 
canister and the bedrock. The repository was planned to be built at a depth of 400–700 metres. As an 
alternative concept horizontal disposal (KBS-3H26) was also studied. In the horizontal version no holes 
in tunnel floors were needed. (Posiva, 2008, Appendix 12A, 4–3, 30.) In the repository design a change 
was made from one shaft to several shafts, thereby making the construction less complex by avoiding 
demanding construction inside the shaft. (Nikula et al., 2012, 132.) 
Posiva submitted the application for a construction licence for the repository in December 2012. The 
repository will be built at a depth of 400-450 metres. (Posiva CLA, 2012, Appendix 5, 3.) Detailed 
safety and security research was ongoing and the technical details were further developed. The KBS-
3V model has been the reference design for Posiva for the final disposal, but the alternative horizontal 
design is being developed. In KBS-3H the canisters are placed horizontally in tunnels filled with 
bentonite.  It is also possible that several canisters can be emplaced in the same tunnel.  In the KBS-3V 
design the canister is made of copper-iron and compacted bentonite is planned to be used as buffer 
material. The canisters will be emplaced in a hole in the floor of the repository tunnel. The tunnels will 
be filled with buffers made of Friedland clay. The number of fuel assemblies to be placed in a canister 
will vary depending on the reactor from which the fuel originates. For example, only four fuel 
assemblies of the Olkiluoto 3 unit will be placed into one canister due to their greater heat production 
compared to the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 units. (Posiva CLA, 2012, Appendix 7, 5–8.) 
                                               
25 In 2008 the power company Fennovoima proposed that total capacity at Olkiluoto should be 18000 tU as the company 
wanted to join the project. The proposal was rejected. (Kari, Kojo & Litmanen, 2010, 8). 
26 Äikäs (2013) believed that Posiva could perhaps apply the KBS-3H concept in the future, but that operations would begin 
with the KBS-3V concept. 
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In the application Posiva requested a change in the approval procedure. The company suggested that 
possible changes to be made to the plans presented in the CLA would need only approval by STUK and 
not by the Government. (Posiva CLA, 2012). The Finnish Association for Nature Conservation 
opposed this change.  The Association argued that if there were essential changes in the current 
concept, a new environmental impact assessment process would be needed for an alternative concept. 
(The Finnish Association for Nature Conservation, 2013.)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  32
6. Conclusions 
This paper reports a case study analysing the transfer and major modifications of the Swedish KBS-3 
disposal concept for spent nuclear fuel by the power company Teollisuuden Voima and later by the 
waste management company Posiva in Finland. The case involves international nuclear waste politics, 
national policies, the role of private companies in the energy market and the overall development in the 
field of nuclear waste management. The research questions of this paper were as follows: (1) What 
were the main modifications to the final disposal concept? (2) What societal arguments stated by TVO 
and Posiva can be found behind the modifications? (3) How has the relationship between TVO, Posiva 
and SKB in information sharing and technology transfer changed since the 1970s? The case study 
covers the time period from 1978 to 2012, i.e. from the first Nuclear Waste Study to the Construction 
Licence Application of the repository. 
Differing views on technology transfer were presented: the technology transfer model, the diffusion 
model and the technology translation model. The technology translation model was applied because it 
emphasizes the continuous transformation of the token, i.e. the final disposal concept. Latour (1986) 
introduces the model of translation where “the spread in time and space of anything – claims, orders, 
artefacts, goods – is in hands of people”. People may act very differently in relation to the token. The 
point of the model is that actors are needed, because otherwise the token simply stops, as according to 
Latour (1986, 267) the token derives its energy from “the everyone in the chain who does something 
with it”. Therefore the actors of the network are assigned an important role in the translation model. 
There is also an active network behind the translation of the KBS concept. The objective of this case 
study was not to analyse these actors and their initiatives in shaping the concept in detail, but to form a 
holistic picture of the major modifications to the concept and the societal arguments for either changing 
the concept or keeping it untouched.  
Societal argumentation as such by the main actors TVO and Posiva was scarce in the research data. 
This was not a great surprise as the data consisted of technical oriented reports, but we felt that it was 
important to trace societal argumentation regarding the development of the ‘technical’ concept as these 
reports have been submitted and applied as references in the Finnish decision-making process. 
However, the argumentation can be summarized in the leading guiding principle of the actor, i.e. TVO 
and Posiva adopted a pragmatic and cost-conscious policy regarding nuclear waste management. 
As TVO was a novice in nuclear waste management in the 1970s and still in the 1980s, the company 
deliberately started to compile information and experiences from abroad, especially from Sweden, 
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where the reactor technology for the Olkiluoto 1 NPP unit was acquired. The pragmatic operating mode 
was supported by the Finnish nuclear waste management system and thus a very positive attitude to 
international cooperation and follow-up of foreign R&D dominated the work. Furthermore, the 
geology, crystalline rock type of the Fennoscandian Shield is partly similar in Finland and Sweden, 
which made the KBS concept attractive to TVO.  
In 1978 the first reference concept for nuclear waste management was introduced in Finland. At that 
time nuclear waste management and the concept development was very closely linked to the licence 
procedures for NPPs, which put pressure on TVO as a licensee. The concept, KBS, was adapted from 
the Swedish R&D work conducted by SKBF. At the time Finnish nuclear waste policy and the plan by 
TVO was based on shipping nuclear waste abroad for reprocessing and disposal. A repository in line 
with the KBS-1 concept was planned for the disposal of the resultant vitrified high-level nuclear waste 
if shipped back to Finland. However, due to the changes in international nuclear waste politics and the 
cost-conscious policy of TVO, the reprocessing option was displaced by the KBS-3 concept and later 
rejected. Problematization of the concept changed as nuclear waste management became a national 
issue instead of being part of the international nuclear fuel cycle. 
Moreover, the relationship between TVO, later Posiva, and SKB has changed as the novice has become 
a collaborator. Currently, SKB-Posiva co-operation is based on identifying issues of common interest. 
From the viewpoint of Posiva the collaboration and agreements have been perceived to be cost 
effective for both parties. However, the new position in technology transfer has also created a challenge 
for  Posiva  as  it  can  no  longer  solve  problems  by  relying  on  technology  transfer.  The  situation  is  
described as exceptional in the Finnish nuclear power business (Nikula et al., 2012, 125). The 
development and planning needed for implementation has to be gained on the basis of research 
conducted mainly in Finland. 
The KBS-3 final disposal concept has been very resistant against direct societal concerns. Therefore the 
main principle of the concept has remained almost the same for nearly 30 years. The major change has 
been the re-interpretation of geology. First the role assigned to the host bedrock was to function as one 
important release barrier, whereas later its primary role was to safeguard the technical barriers and to 
serve only secondarily as a release barrier. This change of vision also changed the view on the long-
term predictability of the bedrock from the viewpoint of the endurance of the technical release barriers. 
(Nikula et. al. 2012, 195.) This change of thought due to new knowledge could become quite 
significant in the future. As Äikäs commented in his interview, this could also mean changes in how to 
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look at site selection in the future. According to Äikäs (2013), this could leave more flexibility in the 
selection of a site and the final disposal could be designed to fit a certain place. 
However, it would be unfair to claim that the KBS-3 concept has remained unchanged and not been 
developed (see Appendix 1). It has only been very resistant to any sudden fundamental changes due to 
uncontrolled societal pressure. The most obvious modifications can be seen in the technical design of 
the inner part of the canister. Canister materials and the filling of the canisters have also been subject to 
change. The size of the canisters has also been modified, because the different types of reactors 
operating in Finland are producing different kinds of spent fuel. Later on the modernization of the NPP 
units and nuclear power new build in Finland have increased the amount of SNF, and therefore the final 
disposal capacity of the repository has been increased from 1200 tU to 9000 tU. Decisions on nuclear 
new build are examples of the direct impact of political choices on the disposal concept. These impacts, 
for instance in the form of increased disposal capacity, have been in line with the interests of pro-
nuclear policy arrangements (Litmanen & Kojo, 2011). 
The modifications of the concept have taken place more or less under the control of R&D activity in 
which the waste management company has been the driving force. As the reference concept has 
remained unchanged for decades we surmise that the planning of R&D programmes has managed to 
address and filter most of the societal concerns relating to the concept. Another explanation would be 
that Finnish society has not voiced powerful concerns or exerted political pressure on the concept (see 
e.g. Raittila, 2001; Raittila & Suominen, 2002). As in many other countries the focus of local civil 
society in Finland was more on the site selection process and related procedures. For instance, those 
recent societal concerns (such as retrievability, copper corrosion and permafrost) that have generated 
some more debate around the concept have been incorporated into the R&D planning system (see e.g. 
Litmanen et al., 2013). Concerns have turned into research issues but not directly to technical 
modifications. For example, according to Lehtonen (2010; see also Darst & Dawson, 2010) Posiva 
integrated the demand for retrievability into the concept as a result of a public debate. However, the 
demand did not change the technical core of the final disposal concept as such, but the idea of the 
retrievability of spent nuclear fuel changed the interpretation of the concept. This kind of persistence 
(or fluidity) of the KBS Program has also been reported in Sweden (Elam & Sundqvist, 2011, 260). 
The flexibility of the KBS concept is perhaps one reason why the concept has been so resistant towards 
major changes. According to Nikula et al. (2012, 125), a certain reflexivity had to be retained, which 
they also described as a challenge for the project. This led to a process in which the design developed 
in two ways; some parts at a very conceptual level, while other parts were planned in a very detailed 
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manner. This notion also appears in the research data. Flexibility could at least partly be understood as 
a result of company driven policy. The responsibility for the planning and implementation of final 
disposal is in the hands of industry (the licensees) in whose interests it is to safeguard their long-term 
business interests. The recent request of Posiva to change approval procedure of some concept 
modifications suggests an attempt to ensure flexibility in decision-making, also in the future. The 
possible impact of the unpredictable and less controllable ‘social dimension’ on the concept is limited 
and decision-making power is vested in the technical experts. 
In the pragmatic style of Finnish nuclear waste policy the final decisions are kept open until the 
decision has to be taken. In maintaining flexibility towards the future, one can wait for new technical 
innovations and also better technical solutions, but at the same time in accordance with pragmatism, the 
current disposal concept is urged forward. 
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Appendix 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
27 The information in this table has been collected from the main reports as well as other reference reports (see research data on pages 11–13).  
28 60 years life-time of four reactors would generate approx. 4 000 tU (about 2180 canisters) and with two additional 1500 MW units in total 9 000 tU (about 4 500 canisters) (Posiva, 1999, 24). 
  1978 1982 1985 1992 1996 1999 2008 2012 
 Main Report27 Nuclear Waste 
Study 
YJT-82-46 YJT-85-30 YJT-92-31E Posiva-96-17 DiP Application  DiP Application Construction Licence 
Application 
 Ref. concept KBS-1 KBS-2 KBS-3 KBS-3 KBS-3 KBS-3 KBS-3V KBS-3V 
 Main 
alternative 
concepts 
Reprocessing 
and disposal of 
vitrified high-
level waste  
Swedish model, 
Canadian model, 
Swiss model 
Reprocessing 
and shipping 
SNF abroad, 
Swiss model.  
WP cave,  
Very Deep Holes, 
Very Long Holes, 
Medium Long Holes 
KBS-3-2C, 
Short Horizontal Holes, 
Medium Long Holes.  
Deep hole or WP Cave. 
Siting straight into 
tunnels or in horizontal 
position  
KBS-3H  KBS-3H 
 Planned 
capacity 
- 1200 tU 1270 tU 1840 tU 2600 tU 2600–9000 tU 12000 tU 9000 tU 
  NPP units TVO1, TVO2 TVO1, TVO2 TVO1, TVO2 TVO1, TVO2 OL1, OL2, Lo1, Lo2 OL1-3, Lo1-3 OL1-4, Lo1-3 OL1-4, Lo1-2 
C
an
is
te
r 
   Design of the  
canister 
 
Copper, steal, 
lead, and 
titanium or 
copper and 
aluminium-
oxide  
Copper. Filling 
aluminium, zinc, 
or lead.  
໅ 77 cm,  
length 4,7m 
Copper 
Filled with 
lead. 
໅ 80 cm,  
length 4,5 m 
Copper canister filled 
with cast lead. 
ACP canister with 
copper 6 cm and steel 
5,5 cm. Filling quartz, 
glass beads or lead 
shot.  
ACP canister: ໅ 80 cm, 
length  4,5 m 
Copper canister, with nodular 
graphite cast iron insert. The 
air in the canister replaced 
with helium.  
Two different types of 
canisters:  
for BWR fuel 4,5 m and  
for VVER fuel 3,55. ໅ 0,880 
m. Filling helium.  
Copper-iron canister. 
Filling helium. 
Buffer, compacted 
bentonite and bentonite 
clay 
Outer ໅ ~1m.  
Length: 
LO 3,60 m,  
OL 4,80 m 
 
Copper-steel 
canister.  
໅ 1,05m.  
Lengths:  
BWR canister 
4,8 m  
EPR 5,2 m  
VVER 3,6 m  
Copper-steel canister. 
໅ 1,05 m.  
Lengths:  
BWR 4,8 m 
PWR 5,2 m 
VVER 3,6 m  
BWR 2100kgU, 
VVER 1464 kgU, 
PWR 2128 kgU 
 Alternative 
canister designs  
Aluminium-
oxide and 
ceramic glass 
materials.  
Copper, titanium  
titanium or 
nickel-base 
alloys, austenic 
stainless steels, 
lead 
Copper, 
titanium and 
titanium 
alloys, nickel-
base alloys, 
ceramic 
    
 
  
 Number of 
canisters, 
 
Capacity (tU) of 
canister type  
 ~ 850 canisters, 
holding 498 fuel 
rods (1,4 tU)  
900 canisters 
with 8 
assemblies 
(1,4 tU) 
 
1200 canisters with  
9 fuel assemblies  
(1,6 tU) 
BWR 960 canisters/ 
11 bundles (1,96tU)  
EVVR 560 canisters / 
11 assemblies (1,32 tU)  
For 260028 tU  
LO 530 canisters 
containing 12 
assemblies (1,44 tU),  
OL 870 canisters 12 
assemblies (2,14 tU)   
4-12 assemblies 
depending on 
type of fuel  
1,4–2,2tU 
depending on 
fuel.  
LO1-2 750  canisters,  
OL1-2 1400 canisters, 
OL3-4 2350 canisters,  
4–12 assemblies 
depending on fuel 
type 
 Canister wall  20 cm 20 cm 10 cm 6 cm 5 cm 5 cm 5 cm 5 cm  
B
en
to
ni
te
  
ba
rr
ie
r 
Backfilling of 
disposal tunnels 
Quarz-bentonite  Sand and 
bentonite  
Sand and 
bentonite 
Sand and bentonite Bentonite and crushed rock Crushed rock and 
bentonite  
Compressed 
filling blocks 
Compressed filling 
blocks of Friedland 
clay 
Barrier 
surrounding the 
canister 
Quarz-bentonite Compacted 
bentonite 
(pure)blocks  
Compacted 
bentonite 
(pure)blocks 
Bentonite blocks Compacted bentonite  Compacted bentonite 
clay 
Compressed 
bentonite clay 
Compressed bentonite 
clay blocks 
B
ed
ro
ck
 
 
Tunnel depth / 
Minimum 
distance 
between the 
holes  
500 m / 4 m 500 m / 6 m 500 m / - 300–800 m / 6 m 500 m / Olkiluoto 7,3 m, 
Kivetty and Romuvaara  8 m.  
400–700m / 6–8 m 400–700 m /  
6–11 m  
400–450 m / 9,5 m 
